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Abstract:
In the run up to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has undergone far-reaching investment
liberalisation. As part of this investment liberalisation process, existing restrictions on foreign
ownership structure and mandatory export and technology transfer requirements imposed on
foreign firms have been lifted in a number of industries. We exploit these facts to identify the
causal effects of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and technology take-off and to
evaluate whether the level of foreign ownership plays a role in stimulating these changes. Using
doubly robust propensity score reweighted bivariate probit regressions to control for the selection
bias associated with firm level foreign acquisition incidences, we uncover strong but heterogeneous
positive effects on export activity for all types of foreign ownership structure. We also find that
minority foreign owned acquisition targets experience higher likelihood of R&D, providing
evidence that joint ventures between foreign owners and Chinese firms can contribute positively
to China’s “science and technology take-off”.
21. Introduction
There are a number of theoretical models that examine the host country welfare effects of foreign
investment liberalisation (Markusen 2004; Egger et al., 2007; McGrattan and Prescott, 2009). This
literature has significantly enhanced our understanding of the mechanisms through which
investment liberalisation can enhance growth. Two key mechanisms are identified in this respect:
technological development and trade expansion. McGrattan and Prescott (2009) provide a
theoretical analysis that shows greater openness to FDI leads to substantial gains in the opening
economy through the exploitation of investing countries’ technology capital. Markusen (2004)
predicts significant trade effects of foreign investment liberalisation, these effects being positive
or negative depending on whether FDI is vertical or horizontal. 1
This paper contributes to this line of inquiry by evaluating the impact of foreign investment
liberalisation on the probability that a firm enters exports markets for the first time, and the
likelihood that a firm experiences technology take-off, which we define as engaging in R&D
activity for the first time. We are mainly interested in analysing whether the degree of foreign
ownership attracted by the firm plays a role in facilitating these processes. This is done by using a
comprehensive firm level database covering enterprises in the Chinese manufacturing sector which
allows us to identify the sub-population of firms with no exports, R&D and FDI before China
joined the WTO in 2001. Some of these firms are subsequently partly or wholly acquired by
foreign MNEs courtesy of investment liberalisation entailed by WTO entry, and we are able to
trace the exporting and R&D transitions of individual firms between the pre- and post-
liberalisation periods.
1 Amiti and Wakelin (2003) take this prediction to bilateral FDI and export data, and conclude that investment
liberalization stimulates exports when countries differ in relative skill endowments provided trade costs are not too
high.
3Our empirical strategy exploits major changes in FDI policy following investment liberalisation in
China. Firstly, the fact that restrictions on foreign ownership structure have been lifted in a
number of industries allows us to investigate the role of ownership structure on the FDI-
export/R&D nexus. Secondly, the removal of mandatory export and technology transfer
requirements imposed on foreign firms affords us the opportunity to identify more precisely the
causal effects of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and technology take-off.
China is an interesting case study to evaluate these effects as it is well-documented that exports
promotion and technology transfer are the two most important FDI policy objectives in China
(Long, 2005). Macroeconomic figures would appear to suggest that the investment liberalisation
process undergone by China in the run up to its accession to the WTO in 2001 has met with
success. By 2010, about 14 percent of global foreign direct investment flows went into the Chinese
economy. China also accounted for roughly 10 percent of world-wide exports in 2010, making it
the world’s top exporter in that year (WTO, World Trade Report 2011). Over the same time,
China has begun what Jefferson and Gao (2007) term its “science and technology (S&T) take-off”.
Data available from the World Development Indicators also show that, between 1996 and 2007,
China increased its R&D expenditures from 0.5 to 1.4 present of GDP – making it comparable to
many industrialized countries. Investigating the causal effects of foreign ownership structure on
export entry and technology take-off during this investment liberalization period is therefore not
only of academic merit but also highly policy relevant.
In order to evaluate the causal effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D and exporting, we
implement a propensity score reweighting estimator (Hirano et al., 2003) combined with covariate
adjustment, the so-called doubly-robust estimator (Bang and Robins, 2005). A major advantage of
the doubly robust estimator is that it provides correct identification even if either the propensity
score or the conditional mean regression models are misspecified. The use of propensity score
based methods - in most cases propensity score matching- to infer the causal effects of foreign
4acquisitions is not new to the applied international economics literature [e.g. Girma and Görg
(2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009)]. But to our knowledge this is the first paper that combines
propensity score weighing with covariate adjusted regressions, and thus exploits the opportunity
this offer to obtain robust inference even under possible model misspecification.
Besides identifying causal relationships using an empirical method most appropriate to the
demands of the data, this paper addresses a number of important issues that have either been
underexplored or unexplored in the existing literature. Firstly we investigate the R&D and export
decisions jointly. Thus far, the literature on the effects of foreign acquisitions has tended to
concentrate on either technology or exporting.2 However, as Bustos (2011) and Hanley and
Monreal-Perez (2012) show theoretically and empirically, technology upgrading (through
investments in R&D or skills) and exports are likely to be related. Firms may either upgrade
technology pre-export entry to improve quality or post-export entry through learning effects.
Secondly, we look specifically at whether the degree of foreign ownership (or ownership structure)
matters for technology upgrading and exports. This has, to the best of our knowledge, not received
much attention in the literature. An exception is Thomas et al. (2008), who provide a descriptive analysis
showing that foreign owners forming contractual agreements with local partners through joint ventures, equity joint
ventures and joint stock enterprises are more successful in inducing new product developments than wholly owned
firms. However, in their empirical approach they cannot claim to establish causal relationships. Another related
paper is Guadalupe et al. (2012), who investigate the link between foreign acquisition and
innovation activity using firm level data for Spain. They also use a propensity score reweighting
estimator, though not a doubly-robust estimator. Also, in contrast to our paper, they do not
investigate whether ownership structure matters.
2 For example, a number of papers employing propensity score matching show that foreign acquisitions lead to
productivity increases (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009), where the implicit assumption is that technology improvements
drive these increases in productivity. A number of studies also look at the relationship between acquisitions and
exporting, see, for example, Du and Girma (2009) using firm level data for China.
5Thirdly, a distinctive feature of our paper is the focus on new export market entrants and first time
R&D investors. Prior exporting and R&D experience or lack thereof could be a sign of some
unobserved firm level heterogeneity, and it can be empirically difficult to disentangle state-
dependence from acquisition effects. Thus focusing on changes in exporting and R&D status
provides a cleaner identification strategy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses investment liberalisation
episodes in China, and how these inform our study. Section 3 describes the firm level data we use
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology used.
Section 5 discusses our main findings, and reports results from a number sensitivity and robustness
analyses. Some concluding comments are presented in Section 6.
2. Institutional background
We provide a brief description of the salient features of foreign investment liberalisation in China
in order to show that China provides a very suitable test case to investigate the relationship
between FDI, export entry and technology take-off. This will also help demonstrate how changes
in FDI legislations resulting from investment liberalisation have informed the design of our
econometric analysis.
Prior to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s FDI policy was rather restrictive involving a
cumbersome examination and approval system through which the government exerted control
over the entry of foreign firms (Chen, 2011; Qin, 2007). Depending on the industries they operate
in, FDI projects were classified into categories of encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited.
The restrictions imposed on foreign firms ranged from performance requirements to foreign
equity share limits. However, as Qin (2007) reports, following the investment liberalisation the
number of encouraged industries has increased from 186 to 262, while restricted industries
decreased from 112 to 75.
6More relevant to this study, and as discussed by Chen (2011) and Long (2005), the major changes
in legislation on foreign investment in non-prohibited industries are (i) FDI may take the form of
wholly foreign-owned enterprises or equity joint ventures with no restriction placed on foreign
partners being the minority or majority shareholders (including the stipulation that foreign parties
are required to contribute at least 25 percent of total capital); (ii) Mandatory export requirements
imposed on wholly owned foreign firms (they were required to export at least 70 per cent of their
production) and joint ventures has been removed; (iii) The requirement for wholly-owned foreign
firms to engage in technology transfer and establish R&D centres is also no longer in place.
A noticeable effect of the exogenous (from the firms’ point of view) policy shift towards greater
investment liberalisation is that wholly owned FDI enterprises have become the most popular
form of FDI in China (Long, 2005). This indeed motivates our concern whether ownership
structure mediates the FDI-export/R&D relationship. How should ownership structure affect
technology upgrading and exports? There are two plausible arguments. Firstly, one may expect
that a higher foreign ownership share should lead to higher levels of investment in technology and
skills. There is case study evidence by Mansfield and Romeo (1980) that multinational parent firms
transfer more up-to-date technology to wholly-owned affiliates than to joint ventures. Also,
econometric studies by Asiedu and Efahani (2001) and Javorcik and Saggi (2010) show that
multinationals with the highest level of technology enter host countries via wholly owned affiliates
rather than joint ventures. This higher use of technology may arguably translate into technology
upgrading and higher export activity in the foreign acquisition targets.
Secondly, however, one may also make a case that higher foreign ownership may be associated
with lower technology and skill upgrading, if one assumes that there are different levels of
technology gaps between purchaser and target depending on the level of foreign-ownership. If
foreign owned firms tend to cherry pick the “best” targets for wholly-owned takeovers, then there
may be only little need for technology upgrading as these firms are already operating close to the
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7technology frontier. However, for partially-owned firms, which are initially operating using lower
levels of technology, there would be a higher technology gap vis-a-vis the target and the purchaser,
hence, a higher level of technology and skill upgrading would be possible after the acquisition.
Another, less benevolent view, may be that foreign owners are more likely to integrate wholly-
owned affiliates completely into their international production network, stripping the affiliate of
its R&D activities and relocating it to the headquarters. This may be less likely if the Chinese
partner is involved. The theoretical expectation is, therefore, ambiguous and needs to be decided
by empirical evidence.
It is precisely because hitherto existing restrictions on foreign ownership structure and mandatory
export and technology transfer requirements imposed on foreign firms had been lifted as part of
the investment liberalisation process, that we are better positioned to identify the causal effects of
different forms of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and technology take-off.
3. Description of the dataset
Our empirical analysis draws on a comprehensive firm level dataset, the Annual Reports of
Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the China National Bureau of Statistics. The dataset
covers all firms in China with an annual turnover of more than 5 million Yuan (about $785,000).
These companies account for an estimated 85–90 percent of total output in most industries. The
dataset includes information on the fraction of paid-in capital by foreign investors, R&D
expenditure, employee training expenditure, export value, gross output, value added, wages,
employment, ownership structure, industry affiliation, and geographic location, amongst other
variables. The data used in the analysis cover the period 2001 (China’s WTO entry year) to 2007
(just before the onset of the global financial crisis) and comprises more than 1.3 million
observations from about 446,000 firms.
8However, in view of the objective of this paper which is to identify the technology take-off and
export market entry effects of foreign acquisition following investment liberalization, our
econometric analysis is confined to firms which had no prior exporting and R&D in 2001. Of
those, we then define a “treatment group” as those firms that attracted foreign capital for the first
time between 2002 and 2006. Those firms that remained in domestic hands during the observation
period are our “control group”, again provided that they had no exporting and R&D activity prior
to 2002. We also impose the condition that a firm has to be observed for at least three consecutive
years in the sample. This leads us to an unbalanced panel of 27,513 firms spanning the period
2001-2007. This panel data allow us to control for pre-acquisition characteristics and evaluate the
post-treatment effects on the year of acquisition and two periods following acquisition.
We define a foreign acquisition in time t as a firm that has a zero foreign ownership share in t-1,
and a positive share in t. Acquisitions with “high” foreign ownership shares may have different
implications that those with “low” foreign involvement. Rather than distinguishing two categories
of shared and full ownership, as e.g., in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), we consider four foreign
ownership categories based on the share of capital paid in by the foreign investors. These allow
us a finer distinction, by providing for possible differences between minority and majority foreign
ownership categories.
The first category comprises those acquired firms with a share of foreign capital lower than 25 per
cent (which we refer as small minority foreign acquired firms). This takes account of specificity in
China, namely, that these are defined by the Chinese authorities as local firms, but with some level
of foreign capital. The second category includes firms with a foreign share higher than or equal
to 25 per cent but lower than 50 per cent, which are considered foreign firms with minority foreign
ownership. Our third category contains firms with a foreign share higher than or equal to 50 per
cent but lower than 100 per cent, that is, foreign firms with majority foreign ownership. Finally,
our last category comprises those fully (i.e., 100 percent) acquired firms.
9Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of foreign acquired firms in the sample by type of foreign
acquisition and year. We ascertain that 1,509 firms (about 5.5 per cent of our sample of firms)
received foreign capital for the first time between 2002 and 2006. Wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries made up 34 per cent of total acquired firms during the observation period, foreign
subsidiaries with majority foreign control accounted for 23 per cent, joint ventures with minority
foreign participation represented 33 per cent and local firms that attracted low levels of foreign
capital accounted for the remaining 10 per cent.
For the acquired firms, our dataset also allows us to distinguish the origin of the foreign investor.
In this paper we distinguish between two types of investors: those Chinese companies investing
from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao (which we refer as ethic Chinese investors) and those
multinational firms investing from the rest of the world (which we regard as foreign MNEs). Our
dataset also allows us to identity the type of local partnership, namely private versus state-owned
local partners.
Table 1 also shows the distribution of acquired firms according to these characteristics3. The
sample is fairly balanced between takeovers by ethnic Chinese investors and MNEs from other
countries across most of foreign ownership categories. By contrast, foreign acquisitions with state-
owned entities as local partners are more common amongst takeovers with higher foreign
participation (while 43 percent of small minority foreign acquired firms involve state-owned
entities as local partners, this fraction increases to 52 and 66 percent amongst minority and majority
acquisitions, respectively).
[Table 1 here]
3 The raw data also show that the foreign acquisitions exhibit considerable diversification across different industries.
Detail is available upon request.
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Table 2 gives precise definitions of the main variables used in the analysis. These consist of the
treatment variables (type of foreign acquisitions), the outcome variables (R&D and exporting
market entry) and the pre-acquisition characteristics which are hypothesised to affect the likelihood
of acquisition as will be discussed in the next section.
[Table 2 here]
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of exporting and R&D firms by foreign ownership structure
(relative to domestic firms) in the year of acquisition and a year later. This preliminary graphical
analysis shows a substantial gap between the proportion of domestic and foreign export firms.
The gap is roughly proportional to the share of foreign capital, and increasing over time. By
contrast, apart for small minority foreign firms, the differential between the proportion of
domestic and foreign R&D firms is not that large and it decrease with the share of foreign capital.
This preliminary description suggests that acquired firms with higher levels of foreign ownership
are more likely to experience larger export benefits. In contrasts, technological improvements seem
to be more likely to occur amongst acquired firms with lower foreign control.
Table 3 provides summary statistics of pre-acquisition characteristics by type of acquisition. Simple
t-tests of equality of means reveal that future recipients of foreign capital were younger, larger,
more productive, less leveraged, and paid higher wages compared to firms that remained
domestically-owned4.
[Table 3e]
Overall, these descriptive statistics points out the necessity of adjusting for differences in
observable characteristics in the treated and control groups in order to accurately identify our post-
acquisition effects.
4Full detail of the t-tests is omitted in the interest of saving space. Results are available upon request.
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4. Empirical methodology
Recall that the chief research question is whether a hitherto non-exporting and non-R&D firm is
more likely to become an exporter and upgrade its technological capacity by undertaking R&D
when it receives foreign capital. A second question is whether the degree of foreign ownership
plays a role in stimulating these changes. Thus the main parameter of interest is the average
treatment or causal effect of foreign acquisitions on the probability of exporting and engage in
R&D for the first time. The outcome variable of interest is therefore the change in exporting and
R&D status between the pre and post-acquisition periods, akin to using difference-in-differences
strategy.
a. Basic set up
As discussed in Section 3, we define one domestic ownership and four foreign ownership
structures, which we denote as s=1,…,4, where: (1) s=1 if the foreign ownership share is less than
25 percent, (2) s=2 if the share of foreign ownership ranges from 25 to 49 percent, (3) s=3 if the
share of foreign capital is between 50 and 99 percent, and (4) s=4 if the firm is fully acquired (100
percent) by the foreign investor. In the presence of multiple treatments, the researcher can in
theory consider any pairwise combination of the categories and estimate the desired treatment
effects (e.g. Lechner, 2002). Consistent with the objective of this paper, we set domestic ownership
as the control group (s=0) to construct the counterfactual outcome had newly foreign-owned firms
remained in domestic hands. However, by way of further analysis, we will also report results from
setting wholly foreign owned firms as the counterfactual group.
We define our foreign ownership treatment variable ܨ௜௧௦ (for each s=1,…,4) equal 1 if firm i that
has been in domestic hands up to year t-1, is acquired at time t under the foreign ownership
category s; and 0 if it still remains domestically owned. Let ௜ܻ௧ାఛ௦ be the potential outcome under
foreign ownership category s at time t+ ≥0. Also denote by ௜ܻ௧ାఛ଴ the potential outcome had
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the firm not received any foreign capital. For each firm, only one outcome is observed, the
remaining four outcomes are counterfactuals. As mentioned before, in our empirical analysis these
outcomes refer to probability of observing a change in the firm’s R&D/exporting status between
time t and t+. We evaluate the post-investment effects on the year of acquisition and two
subsequent periods.
To evaluate the average treatment effects of type-s foreign ownership, we need to estimate the
difference between the mean outcome of all firms receiving foreign capital under foreign
ownership s, and the mean outcome of the same group of firms had they not become foreign
subsidiaries:
ߠ௧ାఛ
௦ = ܧ[ ௜ܻ௧ାఛ௦ − ௜ܻ௧ାఛ଴ ] [1]
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the quantity ௜ܻ௧ାఛ଴ is unobservable. That is,
we cannot observe the technology and exporting status of foreign acquired firms had they not
received FDI. Taking the mean outcome of all domestic firms as an approximation is inappropriate
because it is most likely that firms’ characteristics that determine the equity position of the foreign
investor also determine their future performance.
In the microeconometric evaluation literature, selection on observables refers to the fact that the
treatment and control group differ with respect to some measurable characteristics or
confounders. Thus selection on observable makes a simple comparison of post-treatment
outcomes of the two groups problematic. Two popular estimation strategies used to go round this
problem are: (1) covariates/confounders adjusted regression where both the treatment and a
saturated function of the confounders are included, and (2) variants of propensity-score matching,
including inverse propensity score reweighing where subjects with higher ex ante probabilities are
Commented [AA6]: ok
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given less weight to control for selection bias5. As far as the former strategy is concerned, unbiased
identification requires that the researcher specifies the regression equation correctly. On the other
hand, an identification concern with inverse probability weighting is that all relevant confounders
might not be included in the model used to estimate propensity score.
In this paper we identify the causal effects using the so-called doubly-robust estimator due to (Bang
and Robins, 2005; Emsley et al, 2008)6. This estimator combines the propensity score reweighing
estimator due to Hirano et al. (2003)7 with covariates adjustment regression, including a flexible
translog function of the covariates in the regression (also known as a saturated function). The
doubly robust estimator derives its name from the fact that it provides two opportunities to adjust
for selection on observables by combining inverse probability reweighting with regression
covariates adjustment. The main advantage of doubly-robust estimators of causal effects is that by
combining covariates adjusted regression with inverse probability weighting it offers the possibility
of unbiased inference even under model misspecification as long as either the conditional mean
regression or the propensity score models are correctly specified.
An additional complication in our set up is the fact that the outcome variables are discrete and
jointly determined, suggesting that a simple linear probability model is unlikely to be, at least in
5 Some examples of the application of these methods in the international trade literature include Arnold and Javorcik
(2009), Girma and Görg (2007), Görg et al. (2008) and Guadalupe et al. (2012).
6 Also see Stata treatment-effects Reference manual: Release 13, which can be accessed at
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/te.pdf
7 Busso et.al (2009) show that propensity score reweighting estimators typically outperform propensity score matching
estimators. It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, standard matching estimators wouldn’t be appropriate in this
setting because of nonlinearity in the outcome variables.
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theory, an adequate empirical tool. To deal with these features, we model the R&D and exporting
decision jointly using inverse propensity score reweighted bivariate probit regressions which also
include a saturated (translog) function of a host of pre-treatment characteristics. As mentioned
before, this estimator is consistent when the parametric model for either the propensity score (an
ordered logit model of foreign ownership structure in our case) or the regression function
(bivariate probit in our case) is correctly specified.
b. Doubly-robust regression
We consider a series of covariance adjusted propensity-score re-weighted bivariate probit
regressions of the joint decision to export and engage in R&D of the following general form:
ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܴܦ௜௧ାఛ = 1) = ߶ଵ[ߚଵ + ߙଵܨ௜௧௦ + ݃(ܺ௜௧ି ଵ) + ߝ௜௧ାఛ] [2a]
ܲݎ݋ܾ (ܧܺ ௜ܲ௧ାఛ = 1) = ߶ଶ[ߚଶ + ߙଶܨ௜௧௦ + ݃(ܺ௜௧ି ଵ) + ݑ௜௧ାఛ] [2b]
(ߝ,ݑ) ~ܤ ݅ܽݒ ݅ݎܽ݁ݐ ܰ ݋݉ݎ ݈ܽ ൤ቀ00ቁ,൬1 ߩߩ 1൰൨ [2 ]ܿ
for s = 1, 2, 3 and 4, and with error correlation parameter .
In the above equation ܴ ܦ௜௧ାఛ ( ܧܺ ௜ܲ௧ାఛ) is set to 1 if there is a change in the firm’s R&D
(exporting) status between t-1 (pre-acquisition period) and t+, and to 0 otherwise; g(.) is the
translog function which consists of the second order polynomial of the vector of pre-treatment
covariates (X) and their full interactions (i.e. the saturated function).
Because we are interested in average treatment effects (ATE) of foreign acquisition, the doubly
robust estimator would require weighting treatment observations by
ଵ
௉ೞ
and the counterfactual
observations by
ଵ
ଵି௉ೞ
, where ݌௦ is the conditional probability of being acquired under type-s
foreign ownership structure relative to remaining in domestic hands.
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Since we are estimating a nonlinear probability model, neither ߙଵnorߙଶ in the above model is
equivalent to the average treatment effects of foreign acquisitions on the probability of R&D and
exporting respectively8. To recover average treatment effects from bivariate probit estimates we
need to perform further computations. We discuss the steps involved in these computations using
the estimation of the average treatment effects of foreign acquisition on the probability of export
markets entry as an example.
(i) First, we estimate the determinants of foreign acquisition using an ordered logistic regression
and from this we generate the relevant propensity-score ݌௦ (see next sub-section for more detail
on the propensity score estimation).
(ii) Second, we estimate the propensity score-weighted bivariate probit regressions (equations 2a-
2c) with treated firms getting weight of ଵ
௣ೞ
and non-treated firms getting weight of ଵ
ଵି௣ೞ
.
(iii) Based on the bivariate probit model estimates, we predict the potential probability of exporting
under each treatment, ෠ܻ௜௧௦ (i.e. setting ܨ௜௧௦ = 1 for all observations, i=1, …N) and the same
probability under the counterfactual case of no acquisition ܻ෡௜௧଴ (i.e. setting ܨ௜௧௦ = 0 for all
observations) :
෠ܻ
௜௧
௦ = ߶ଶ ൣߚመଶ + ߙොଶ + ො݃(ܺ௜௧ି ଵ)൧ and ܻ෡௜௧଴ = ߶ଶ ൣߚመଶ + ො݃(ܺ௜௧ି ଵ)൧ [3]
(iv) Finally, we calculate the average treatment effect of acquisition on the probability of exporting
as the average difference between the two potential outcomes:ATE = ଵ
ே
∑ ൫ܻ෠௜௧
௦− ෠ܻ௜௧
଴൯ே௜ୀଵ [4]
with standard errors made robust to industry and region clustering.
c. Estimation of the propensity score
8 For a discussion of how to estimate marginal treatment effects from bivariate probit regressions, see Nichols, A
(2011), “Causal inference for binary regression” available http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/chic2011/chi11_nichols.pdf.
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We start by estimating an ordered logit model of foreign ownership structure based on the four
categories of foreign ownership (s=1,...,4) and setting domestic ownership (s=0) as the base group.
We follow Lechner (2002) and predict the corresponding probabilities (omitting firm and time
indices) ߨ௦, s=0, …,4; and compute our propensity score relative to the base category as:
݌௦ = గೞ
గೞାగబ
[5]
We model the probability of following into each of the foreign ownership categories using an
ordered logit specification conditional on g(X), where X is a vector of pre-acquisition covariates
that are hypothesised to impact on the choice of foreign ownership structure, and g represents the
translog function. In our empirical implementation, the vector of covariates X consists of firm
size, age, wages productivity, SOE status and access to finance (leverage) and the full set of industry
and time dummies9. The choice of these covariates is guided by the existing literature on the
determinants of foreign acquisition [e.g. Harris and Robinson (2002); Conyon et al. (2002 and
Girma and Görg (2007)]. Note that the inclusion of leverage in the vector of covariates is
motivated by the argument that Chinese firms with limited access to domestic finance are likely to
be foreign takeover targets (Huang, 2005). However it is worth remembering that as in all
propensity score based methods, the ultimate choice of covariates rests on the success of the
ensuing balancing tests.
The marginal effects from the ordered logit model of the determinants of the foreign ownership
structure are reported in Appendix A.10 The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients are
similar for all four types of ownership share. Our results are consistent with a large body of
empirical work showing that foreign firms have strong preferences for the best performing firms
(“cherry picking”). Thus, we find that younger, larger, more productive and higher waged (a
9 The definition of these variables and their summary statistics are presented in Table 3.
10 The estimated raw coefficients, including the interaction terms between the covariates, are available from the
authors upon request.
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possible proxy for skill composition) firms are more likely to be acquired by foreign investors. By
contrast multinational firms are less inclined to buy into state-owned or highly leveraged firms.
d. Common support and balancing conditions
An important requirement to identifying causal treatment effects is the common support or
overlap condition where the probability of being acquired under category s conditional on X is
bounded away from zero and one. We thus impose the common support condition to ensure that
any combination of characteristics observed in the foreign acquired firms can also be replicated
amongst domestic firms.
In addition, to ensure that the propensity score is successful in controlling for firm differences in
the pre-acquisition period we carry out a series of balancing test. To this end, for each control
group and type-s acquired firms pairing, we divide the sample by propensity score quintile, and for
each subsample we test for equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates between acquired
and non-acquired firms. For the six covariates in X and the four acquisition types, this involves
conducting equality of means tests in each of the five quintiles. In Appendix B, we report the
results from these 120 balancing tests. It is indeed reassuring that these tests emphatically
demonstrate that the balancing conditions are satisfied.
5. Main findings and discussion
5.1 Estimates from the baseline model
Having established that conditional on the propensity score, acquired and non-acquired firms are
comparable, we now present in Table 4 the doubly-robust logistic regression estimates of the causal
effects of foreign acquisitions on the probability of R&D “take-off” and export market entry. We
show the effects in the year of acquisition, and within one year and two years of acquisition.
Commented [AA13]: Ok, good.
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We begin by noting that during the year of acquisition, the effects of the foreign acquisition on the
probability to engage in R&D are either statistically or economically insignificant for all types of
ownership structure. However a clearer pattern starts to emerge within one year of acquisition.
Minority and small minority foreign ownership structures appear to be conducive to R&D take-
off. For example minority foreign acquired firms are 7.4 percent more likely to undertake R&D
than otherwise comparable firms that remained in domestic hands. By contrast wholly owned
foreign firms are 2.7 percent less likely to receive R&D investment compared to their domestically
owned peers. Although we have no direct evidence, we speculate that this pattern is consistent
with the notion that the technology gap between the foreign acquirer and domestic target may play
a role. The foreign acquirer may be engaging in joint ventures with local partners in firms where
the level of technology is below the level of the acquirer. Hence, there is a strong potential for
technology upgrading post-acquisition. For targets that are 100 percent taken over the technology
gap between foreign acquirer and target may be relatively low, thus not necessitating strong efforts
in technology upgrading. For small minority foreign acquired firms, these positive effects on R&D
activity get quite stronger within two years of acquisition, though we have to caution that the
longer the post-acquisition time horizon, the more difficult it might be to isolate the pure effects
due to acquisition.
In contrast to R&D, the FDI-induced causal effects on export markets entry are consistently
positive and persistent across all ownership categories. For example, wholly acquired firms are 17
percent more likely to start exporting within a year of acquisition than domestic firms. This effect
is even more impressive at 20.2 percent for minority acquired firms11.
[Table 4 here]
11 A simple t-test of based on the reported standard errors rejects the null hypothesis of equality of means.
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5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Table 5 reports the causal effect estimates of foreign acquisitions on R&D and exports from a
series of specifications designed to check the sensitivity of our baseline model. All reported results
are based on outcomes within a year of acquisition. As mentioned before, focusing on a short time
horizon allows us to capture better the pure effects due to acquisition.
The first block of Table 5 gives estimates from covariate adjusted bivariate probit regressions
without propensity score reweighting. This approach should deliver consistent estimators as long
as the conditional mean model is correctly specified12. Overall we reach similar conclusions to the
ones based on estimates from the doubly-robust models. Thus foreign takeover unambiguously
boosts export performance in the acquired target, and its positive impact on R&D is confined to
non-majority acquisitions. However it would appear that unweighted regressions overestimate the
beneficial effects of foreign ownership on exporting, especially for majority and whole acquisitions.
This is perhaps not too surprising given that probability reweighing corrects for selection effects
by assigning less weight to firms with higher propensity to be acquired, and hence to export in
the future.
Notwithstanding the fact that linear propensity score matching approach is not theoretically
appropriate for non-linear models, we check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the
estimator by employing a linear probability modelling framework where the decision to export and
engage in R&D are jointly estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions(SURE) framework.
The results from this experiment are shown in the second block of Table 5. It is reassuring to see
that our conclusion that all types of foreign acquisitions are conducive to export markets entry
12 Indeed using some simulation studies, Freedman and Berk (2008) conclude that “if investigators have a good
causal model, (emphasise our own) it seems better just to fit the model without weights”.
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remains intact. We also confirm the beneficial effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D are confined
to minority and small minority joint ventures.
Are the results driven by export processing firms?
A legitimate question at this juncture is whether the positive causal effects of foreign acquisitions
on exporting is driven by the possibility that MNEs might have used some of these firms to process
imported intermediate inputs for exports. If this is indeed the case, our finding that FDI promotes
exports market entry would have looked less impressive. We address this issue by re-estimating
our models without acquired firms that are chiefly used for processing intermediate inputs. We did
so by first matching our firm level data with the transaction level data obtained from the Chinese
Customs Trade Statistics (see Manova and Yu, 2014). We managed to match a third of the exporting
firms in our database to the customs dataset. This allows us to identify a significant proportion of
firms that are engaged in processing trade, 246 of which are in the sub-sample of the database used
for this analysis. This low number can be explained by our research design which ruled out all
firms with positive exports and foreign capital prior to investment liberalisation, precisely the type
of firms that tend to have a high propensity to engage in export processing. For the purpose of
our sensitivity analysis, we classify a firm as engaging in mainly export processing if processing
exports account for more than a half of total exports (processing exports + “ordinary” exports).
The results from this exercise are reported in the third block of Table 5. The effects on R&D are
largely as reported in Table 4. Also reassuringly we confirm that our findings of significant
exporting effects due to foreign acquisitions are nor driven by the presence of major export
processing firms.
Whole acquisition as the counterfactual
Recall that in our baseline treatment effects model we set the counterfactual as being domestically
owned, and we have found economically significant differentials in terms of the effects of foreign
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ownership on exporting and R&D. Our aim here is to check whether these differentials would
persist under a different experimental setting. Accordingly, the last two columns of Table 5 give
the average treatment effects of being partially foreign acquired compared to the counterfactual of
being wholly acquired. Consistent with the findings from our baseline model, we uncover evidence
that non-wholly acquired firms have higher probabilities of undertaking R&D than would have
been the case were they under 100 percent foreign ownership. We also find that the probability of
export market entry is lower compared to the counterfactual scenario of 100 percent foreign
ownership.
[Table 5 here]
5.3 Is the source of FDI important?
Next, we explore whether the effects of the foreign ownership structure is dependent on the
geographic origin of FDI. For instance the technology gaps between the acquirer and the target
might vary with the origin of the foreign investor, and this might have discernible post-acquisition
implications. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between foreign acquirers of Chinese origin or
“ethnic Chinese” (which account for nearly 53 percent of total acquirers) and foreign investors
from the “rest of the world” (mainly from OECD countries).
The results from this exercise (also based on the outcomes within a year of acquisition) are reported
in Table 6. In line with our baseline results presented in Table 4, we show that both types of
investors appear to contribute to the R&D take-off of small minority and minority acquired firms,
and that neither source of FDI appear to increase the likelihood of R&D investment by wholly
acquired firms. Interestingly, we uncover significant positive R&D effects on majority acquired
firms by foreign MNE investors, while the negative effect are confined to those firms that are
acquired by ethnic Chinese investors. As far as the magnitude of the export market entry effects
are concerned, these are much stronger for foreign MNE in all but the case of full acquisitions.
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[Table 6 about here]
5.4 Does the type of local partner matter?
We also investigate whether the post-acquisition effects depend on the ownership status of the
local partner, i.e., whether it is private or state-owned (SOE).13 There are two conflicting views on
choosing SOE as local partners. One view argues that the performance of state owned firms
remains unsatisfactory (e.g. Lin et al, 1998, Xu and Wang, 1999) due to the historical social legacy,
for example, maintaining low levels of unemployment which often meant keeping unskilled labour.
On the other hand, state partnership might have a positive impact on performance because such
foreign firms are politically well-connected and have better opportunities to receive government
subsidies (Sun et al., 2002).
As we report in Table 6, our analysis leads to the conclusion that the role of local partners on R&D
appear to vary across ownership categories. Again, in line with our baseline results presented in
Table 4, we find that FDI contributes to the R&D take-off of small minority and minority acquired
firms regardless of whether the local partner is private or state-owned. A noteworthy result from
this analysis is that majority foreign owned firms with private local partners are significantly more
likely to engage in R&D, whereas majority foreign owned firms with state-owned local partners
continue to experience lower likelihood of R&D investments. Regarding the export activity, our
results confirm that there is a strong evidence of positive export market entry effects for all types
of foreign acquisitions regardless of the local partner. Interestingly, there is a stronger evidence
to suggest that hitherto non-exporting state-owned firms enjoy a higher likelihood of entering
international markets as a result of minority acquisitions by multinational firms.
13 Since we now only consider partnerships with local firms we, by definition, exclude wholly owned affiliates as this
does not involve a local partner.
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5.5 Further analysis
In our baseline model, we abstracted from the various well-documented econometric issues
plaguing the estimation of TFP, and concentrate rather on value added per worker (which in any
case is found to be highly correlated with TFP in most countries’ micro data). However, to check
our results further, in the first block of Table 7 we report the causal effects within one year of
acquisition using TFP estimated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). These results are
reassuringly similar to the ones reported in Table 4.
Accounting for possible spillovers
The average treatment effects estimation framework we employed is underpinned by the
fundamental assumption of the absence of significant spillovers from foreign to domestic firms,
and indeed between foreign firms themselves14. This assumption is known as the stable-unit-
treatment-value assumption (SUTVA). It is of course quite possible that SUTVA does not hold in
the data. In this case, (i) export and R&D spillovers from foreign to domestic firms may occur
(e.g. Mayneris and Poncet, 2013), and (ii) the average impact of foreign acquisition may depend on
the proportion of acquired firms within an industry or region (e.g. agglomeration effects).
As far as foreign to domestic spillovers are concerned, we argue that this concern is greatly
mitigated by the very nature of our experimental setting, namely the fact that we started with firms
with no previous R&D and exporting experience. The scope for newly exporting or R&D investing
foreign firms to transfer their knowledge to domestic firms is arguably limited, at least in the short
post-acquisition period we are focusing on.
14 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to discuss this issue, and for generously suggesting some
ideas.
24
In order to ascertain that our results are not affected by foreign to foreign cross-effects, we exploit
the industrial and spatial dimensions in our data and control for the proportion of foreign acquired
firms in the region and industry when calculating the average treatment effects given in Equation
(4). The results from this exercise are reported in the second block of Table 7, and the pattern and
magnitude of the effects are largely similar to those found earlier. However this exercise also
highlights the existence of potentially interesting exports agglomeration effects associated with
non-minority foreign acquisitions.
Exploring the sequence of R&D investment and exporting
Do firms first engage in R&D or exporting? And what is the role of acquisition FDI in influencing
the timing of this sequence? For the sake of brevity we do not fully explore the issue in the paper,
as we think it is topic which merits to be analysed in its own right and perhaps with more detailed
considerations. Nonetheless in the last two columns of Table 7 we report results from doubly
robust regressions of the impact of FDI on the probabilities to engage in R&D first and exporting
first. For the purpose of this experiment we define exporting (investing in R&D) first if firm
exports (invest in R&D) for the first time anytime between t and t+2, where t is the period of
acquisition. All other combinations are treated as the base group. The results suggest that
acquisition FDI increases the likelihood of exporting first across the ownership structure spectrum.
6. Conclusions
In the run up to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has undergone far-reaching investment
liberalisation. In this paper we exploit the fact that as part of this investment liberalisation process,
existing restrictions on foreign ownership structure and mandatory export and technology transfer
requirements imposed on foreign firms had been lifted in a number of industries, to identify the
causal effects of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and technology take-off. Using
doubly robust propensity score reweighted bivariate probit regressions to control for selection bias
associated with foreign acquisition incidences, we uncover strong but heterogeneous positive
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effects on export activity for all types of foreign ownership structure. We also find that minority
foreign owned acquisition targets experience higher likelihood of R&D.
From policy makers’ perspectives, our results provide solid evidence that joint ventures between
foreign owners and Chinese firms can contribute positively to China’s “science and technology
take-off”. From an academic point of view, our work should inform future theoretical
contributions as we have documented much needed econometric evidence that foreign ownership
structure matters for exporting and R&D decisions, and it is therefore an important source of firm
heterogeneity.
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Table 1
Frequency distribution of sample firms by type of foreign acquisition
By type By type and
local partners
By type and
source of FDI
By type and year
Private State Foreign Ethnic
Chinese
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Small minority
acquisition
152 86 66 79 73 25 12 29 32 54
Minority acquisition 497 240 257 245 252 89 53 96 112 147
Majority acquisition 349 118 231 174 175 69 54 67 66 93
Wholly acquired 511 n.a n.a 213 298 84 43 147 79 158
Total 1509 444 554 711 798 267 162 339 289 452
Note: The number of non-acquired domestic firms in the sample is 26004.
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Figure 1: Foreign ownership structure and the proportion of export and R&D firms:
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Table 2
Definition of the main variables used in the analysis
Variable Definition
Size Log of total employment
Productivity Log of real value added per worker
Wages Log of real wages per worker
Leverage Total liability/total assets.
Age Log of firm age since incorporation
State Owned Enterprise
(SOEs)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the State holds shares in the firm’s
capital, 0 otherwise
Research and
Development
Change Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm starts investing in
R&D, and 0 otherwise
Exports Change Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm starts exporting, and
0 otherwise
Treatment variables
(in all cases with no prior exporting or R&D experience)
Small minority
acquisition
The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirer is
positive but less than 25.
Minority acquisition The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is
greater than or equal to 25 percent but less than 50 percent.
Majority acquisition The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is
greater than or equal to 50 percent but less than 100 percent.
Wholly acquired The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is
equal to 100 percent.
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Table 3
Summary statistics of pre-acquisition characteristics by type of acquisition
Size Productivity Wages Age Leverage SOE
Non-acquired
Mean 4.626 3.846 6.928 2.065 2.547 0.0680
Median 4.564 3.786 6.852 2.079 1.623 0
St. deviation 0.907 1.150 0.985 0.940 2.536 0.252
Observations 26004 26004 26004 26004 26004 26004
Small minority acquisition
Mean 5.214 4.027 7.610 1.906 2.524 0.0526
Median 5.127 3.939 7.530 1.946 1.502 0
St. deviation 1.189 1.263 1.293 0.965 2.573 0.224
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152
Minority acquisition
Mean 4.822 4.012 7.265 1.748 2.734 0.0423
Median 4.718 3.928 7.185 1.792 1.651 0
St. deviation 0.967 1.032 1.065 0.866 2.701 0.201
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
Majority acquisition
Mean 4.895 3.966 7.315 1.560 2.434 0.0430
Median 4.828 3.803 7.288 1.609 1.491 0
St. deviation 0.959 1.220 1.156 0.850 2.534 0.203
Observations 349 349 349 349 349 349
Whole acquisition
Mean 4.792 3.847 7.152 1.437 2.209 0.0294
Median 4.762 3.835 7.074 1.386 1.238 0
St. deviation 0.969 1.097 1.066 0.863 2.460 0.169
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511
Overall
Mean 4.639 3.851 6.947 2.040 2.542 0.0664
Median 4.575 3.790 6.873 2.079 1.613 0
St. deviation 0.914 1.149 0.995 0.943 2.538 0.249
Observations 27513 27513 27513 27513 27513 27513
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Table 4:
Average treatment effects from propensity-score weighted
Double robust regressions
Year of
acquisition
Within one year of
acquisition
Within two years of
Acquisition
Acquisition type R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export
Small minority -0.011*** 0.113*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.289*** 0.138***
(0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0049) (0.0018)
Observations 24907 24907 24816 24816 24728 24728
Minority 0.014*** 0.076*** 0.049*** 0.202*** 0.036*** 0.185***
(0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0041) (0.0004) (0.0028)
Observations 25666 25666 25570 25570 25391 25391
Majority 0.004*** 0.037*** -0.003*** 0.062*** 0.015*** 0.074***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0008)
Observations 25902 25902 25801 25801 25666 25666
Whole -0.007*** 0.084*** -0.027*** 0.170*** -0.034*** 0.161***
(0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0017)
Observations 22980 22980 22889 22889 22746 22746
Notes:
(i) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in
the regression.
(ii) The counterfactual is being domestically owned.
(iii) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
(iv) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Commented [SL27]: SG: shouln't we report the value
and significance of ? Also, I have a silly question: if
the decision to export and invest in R&D are jointly
determined, does it still make sense to talk about the
timing of exporting and R&D, as in section 5.5?
Commented [AA28]: No need to report roughly 50
coefficients for each coluum!!. It is usually a job for
online publication only, and nobody asked us!! Even
then they would have been totally uninformative.
Commented [AA29]: Just because we model the
probability of joint determination, does not means we
can’t also model other probabilities. Note that we did
not STATE that R&D and exports are always go
together. In fact from Pr(RD=1, EXp=1) is just one
option of bivariate probit (the default one), but you
can calculate
Pr(RD=1, EXp=0); Pr(EXP=1|RD=1), or just
Pr(RD=0). Check the postestimation command of
biprobit!
32
Table 5:
Sensitivity analysis
Covariate
adjusted only
without
reweighing
Linear
probability
model
Excluding
major exports
processing firms
Wholly acquired
vs.
partially
acquired firms
Acquisition
type
R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export
Small
minority
0.044*** 0.131*** 0.069*** 0.135*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.049*** -0.099***
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.024) (0.027) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 24816 24816 24816 24816 24800 24800 657 657
Minority 0.054*** 0.139*** 0.070*** 0.141*** 0.049*** 0.203*** 0.088*** -0.095***
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 25570 25570 25570 25570 25553 25553 998 998
Majority -
0.008***
0.188*** -0.010 0.202*** -
0.002***
0.062*** 0.015*** -0.034***
(0.0001) (0.0016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 25801 25801 25801 25801 25777 25777 846 846
Whole -
0.010***
0.276*** -0.011 0.288*** -
0.028***
0.161*** n.a n.a
(0.0001) (0.0019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 22889 22889 22889 22889 22852 22852
Notes:
(i) All results based on outcome within one year of acquisition.
(ii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in
the regressions.
(iii) Results in the last four columns are based on doubly robust propensity score reweighted
bivariate probit estimation.
(iv) The last two columns give average treatment effects of being partially foreign acquired
compared to counterfactual being wholly acquired. In all other cases, the counterfactual is
being domestically owned.
(v) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
(vi) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.
Commented [SL30]: SG, should we mention the
estimator used in the last 4 columns. Doubly robust
propensity score reweighted bivariate probit?
Commented [AA31]: done
33
Table 6:
The role of local partnership and source of FDI
Ethnic Chinese vs. Foreign MNE
acquisitions
Private vs. State-owned
local partners
R&D Exporting R&D Exporting
Acquisitio
n type
Ethnic
Chines
e
Foreig
n
Ethnic
Chines
e
Foreig
n
Privat
e
State Privat
e
State
Small
minority
0.040*** 0.097*** -0.038*** 0.228*** 0.043**
*
0.107**
*
0.024**
*
0.203***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Observatio
ns
24816 24816 24816 24816 24816 24816 24816 24816
Minority 0.074*** 0.030*** 0.172*** 0.228*** 0.095**
*
0.006**
*
0.164**
*
0.251***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005)
Observatio
ns
25570 25570 25570 25570 25570 25570 25570 25570
Majority -0.008*** 0.006*** 0.033*** 0.102*** 0.007**
*
-
0.008**
*
0.089**
*
0.047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observatio
ns
25801 25801 25801 25801 25801 25801 25801 25801
Whole -0.017*** -
0.041***
0.176*** 0.166*** n.a n.a n.a n.a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observatio
ns
22889 22889 22889 22889
Notes:
(i) All results based on outcome within one year of acquisition.
(ii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in
the regression (see Equation 2 in the text for detail).
(iii) The counterfactual is being domestically owned.
(iv) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
(v) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Commented [SL32]: SG, wouldn't be interesting to see
the effects on those firms that were previously SOEs
and became fully acquired?
Commented [AA33]: These four columns are about
local partnership, so it does not make to talk about
previous SOEs (or indeed non-SOEs). In general yes it
might be interesting to know, but not in this table.
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Table 7
Further analysis
With sales based
TFP measure
of productivity
With industry-region
proportion of
acquired firms
Exploring the sequence of
R&D
and exporting
Acquisition
type
R&D Exporting R&D Exporting R&D first vs.
all other
combinations
Exports first
vs. all other
combinations
Small minority 0.073*** 0.110*** 0.074*** 0.107*** -0.201*** 0.071***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
PROP 0.011 -0.024
(0.023) (0.020)
Observations 24816 24816 24816 24816 24907 24907
Minority 0.067*** 0.211*** 0.049*** 0.200*** -0.210*** 0.186***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
PROP -0.0001 0.046
(0.008) (0.052)
Observations 25526 25526 25570 25570 25666 25666
Majority 0.004*** 0.057*** -0.002*** 0.060*** -0.054*** 0.046***
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PROP -0.001** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.013)
Observations 25755 25755 25801 25801 25902 25902
Whole -0.021*** 0.163*** -0.027*** 0.166*** -0.141*** 0.160***
(0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
PROP -0.013 0.072**
(0.008) (0.029)
Observations 22849 22849 22889 22889 22980 22980
Notes:
(i) All results are also based on outcome within one year of acquisition.
(ii) PROP refers to the proportion of other foreign acquired firms in a firm’s industry-region;
a term designed to capture potential spillovers amongst acquired firms.
(iii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are
included in the regression
(iv) The control group consists of domestic firms
(v) Standard errors are given in parentheses.
(vi) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Commented [SL34]: SG: sales?
Commented [AA35]: Sales based, as oppose to value
added based measure of TFP we had. One ref seems to
think value added measure is not so good in China.
Obviously we have to respond to all of their
idiosyncratic demands.
Commented [SL36]: SG, should we mention that all
results are also based on outcome within one year of acquisition?
Commented [AA37]: done
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Appendix A
The determinants of foreign acquisition structure:
Average marginal effects from the ordered logit model
Foreign acquisition type
Small
minority
Minority Majority Whole
Size 0.00008 0.00025 0.00015 0.00009
(0.00027) (0.00081) (0.00052) (0.00088)
Productivity 0.00091*** 0.00274*** 0.00173*** 0.00277***
(0.00015) (0.00042) (0.00028) (0.00045)
Wage 0.00129*** 0.00389*** 0.00246*** 0.00417***
(0.00025) (0.00073) (0.00047) (0.00077)
Age -0.00241*** -0.00732*** -0.00465*** -0.00765***
(0.00023) (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00057)
Leverage -0.00029*** -0.00087*** -0.00056*** -0.00093***
(0.00011) (0.00031) (0.00020) (0.00034)
SOE -0.00141* -0.00429* -0.00273* -0.00449*
(0.00076) (0.00230) (0.00149) (0.00271)
Observations 27513 27513 27513 27513
Notes:
(i) Industry-year effects are controlled for in all regressions.
(ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0
Appendix B
Balancing tests for differences in observed pre-treatment characteristics
Domestic versus small minority acquisition firms
Propensity score
quintile
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE
1 -0.0531 -0.0822 -0.1278 -0.1076 -0.1351 0.0110
(0.223) (0.254) (0.239) (0.149) (0.616) (0.054)
2 0.1430 -0.3068 0.4372 0.1940 0.3885 -0.0383
(0.298) (0.339) (0.319) (0.199) (0.823) (0.072)
3 0.0568 -0.1134 0.2192 -0.0247 0.3480 0.0642
(0.294) (0.335) (0.315) (0.197) (0.812) (0.071)
4 -0.0399 0.0417 0.0914 0.0613 0.1279 -0.0085
(0.258) (0.293) (0.276) (0.173) (0.712) (0.062)
5 0.0576 0.2084 0.0403 -0.0039 -0.4864 -0.0675
(0.228) (0.260) (0.245) (0.153) (0.631) (0.055)
Observations 24907 24907 24907 24907 24907 24907
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(Appendix B continued)
Domestic versus minority acquisition firms
Propensity score
quintile
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE
1 -0.1451 -0.0316 -0.0658 0.0281 -1.4013 -0.1117
(0.383) (0.427) (0.409) (0.259) (1.097) (0.115)
2 0.0295 -0.3235 0.1658 -0.2485 0.4773 0.1936
(0.501) (0.558) (0.535) (0.339) (1.435) (0.150)
3 0.5745 -0.2241 0.6728 0.0459 3.1462* 0.0467
(0.430) (0.479) (0.459) (0.291) (1.232) (0.129)
4 0.2327 -0.1157 0.2496 0.1723 1.6445 0.1026
(0.404) (0.450) (0.432) (0.273) (1.157) (0.121)
5 0.1993 0.2154 0.1512 0.0505 1.2851 0.1023
(0.387) (0.432) (0.414) (0.262) (1.109) (0.116)
Observations 25666 25666 25666 25666 25666 25666
Domestic versus majority acquisition firms
Propensity score
quintile
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE
1 -0.0512 0.0502 0.0638 -0.0287 0.3245 -0.0796
(0.215) (0.238) (0.229) (0.143) (0.607) (0.060)
2 0.0600 0.0535 0.0557 0.0941 -0.3535 0.1029
(0.266) (0.294) (0.284) (0.177) (0.751) (0.074)
3 0.3922 -0.2916 0.3326 0.2118 -0.1724 0.0741
(0.272) (0.301) (0.291) (0.181) (0.770) (0.076)
4 0.1293 -0.0625 0.0534 0.1884 0.2460 0.0782
(0.238) (0.263) (0.254) (0.158) (0.672) (0.066)
5 0.0405 0.0630 -0.0183 -0.0527 0.2918 0.0973
(0.222) (0.245) (0.237) (0.147) (0.626) (0.062)
Observations 25902 25902 25902 25902 25902 25902
Domestic versus whole firms
Propensity score
quintile
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE
1 0.1701 0.1659 0.1723 0.3036 0.4017 0.1368
(0.384) (0.427) (0.412) (0.255) (1.086) (0.101)
2 -0.1829 0.1011 -0.4089 -0.4046 -0.3034 -0.1755
(0.543) (0.603) (0.582) (0.360) (1.534) (0.143)
3 -0.1492 -0.2715 -0.1422 -0.0225 -1.2473 -0.0464
(0.502) (0.557) (0.538) (0.333) (1.419) (0.132)
4 0.0434 0.1442 0.1326 0.0874 -0.6653 -0.1263
(0.433) (0.481) (0.464) (0.287) (1.223) (0.114)
5 0.3044 -0.1407 0.2130 -0.0360 -0.0842 -0.1700
(0.397) (0.440) (0.425) (0.263) (1.121) (0.104)
Observations 22980 22980 22980 22980 22980 22980
